Human Error, Safety and
Reliability
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The interaction of design and human
capabilities |
The Crash of Eastern
Flight 401 - Dec. 1972
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Account drawn from Danaher (1980) |
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Diverted from approach to Miami Int'l
Airport due to light indicating a
malfunction in nose landing gear light. |
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Set autopilot to 2000 feet to reduce
work load while checking nose landing gear. |
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Autopilot was inadvertently switched
off by pilot, leading to a gradual descent. |
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Crew did not notice descent |
The Crash - continued
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ATC saw plane reading at 900 feet. The current system could report errors for
up to three sweeps. |
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The controller did contact plane but
was told all OK. |
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Controller’s attention was diverted by
5 other planes he was responsible for |
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30 seconds later place crashed killing
99 out of 176. |
Crash of Eastern Flight
401 - Errors
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Pilot Error: not watching altitude
which is pilots responsibility |
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Pilot assumed autopilot worked. |
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Controller Error: did not report low
altitude to the pilot |
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(They are required to now). |
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Name all the factors that contributed
to this crash? |
Error
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DEFINITION: an action or lack of action that violates some tolerance
limit(s) of the system. |
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Thus defined in terms of system
requirements and capabilities. |
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The the occurrence of an error does not
imply anything about human, even if it is “the persons fault.” |
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It could be a system flaw |
Try This: Name the Colors
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red blue yellow green |
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yellow green yellow red |
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blue red green blue |
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yellow yellow blue green |
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green red red yellow |
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blue blue green red |
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red green blue yellow |
Try This: Name the Colors
Human Error Probability
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Error Probability (EP) also known as
Human Error Probability (HEP): |
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EP = (# of errors)/(total # of
opportunities for the error) |
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value between 0 and 1 |
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gives rate of errors |
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this is a probabilistic value |
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it does not indicate if an error will
or will not occur |
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just the likelihood |
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does not indicate type or cause of
error |
Reliability
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DEFINITION: Probability of a successful outcome of the system or component. |
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Reliability is also defined in terms of
system requirements. |
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Thus, to evaluate a system it is
necessary to know the goals and purposes of the system. |
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Reliability is a probabilistic term. |
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Never seen the perfect system. |
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Calculation of Reliability |
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R = (# of successful operations)/(total
# of operations) |
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R = 1 - EP |
Human Error
Classification Systems - 1
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Basic Error Types |
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Unintentional vs. Intentional |
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e.g. mistake on a test vs. what speeds
most of us drive. |
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Unrecovered vs. Recovered |
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Recovered: Error with possibility for damage but no damage actually
occurred. (Driving home drunk safely). |
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Unrecovered: Error where damage could not be avoided. |
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The recovered error of one day could be
the next day's unrecovered error. |
Human Error
Classification Systems - 2
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Swain and Guttman’s (1980) Human Error
Categories. |
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Error of Omission |
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tpographicl errrs |
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Error of Commission |
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Hitting thumb with the hammer |
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Extraneous Act |
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reading a different class's assignment
in class |
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Sequential Error |
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My usual: light the fire before opening
the damper |
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Time Error |
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running a red light |
Human Error
Classification Systems - 3
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Meister’s (1971) Types of Failures |
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Based on where the error originates. |
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Operating error: |
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System is not operated according to
intended procedure. |
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Design Error: |
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Designer does not take into account
human abilities. |
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Manufacturing Error: |
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System is not built according to
design. |
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Installation and Maintenance Errors |
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System is not installed or maintained
correctly. |
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Scary how common these are. |
Human Error
Classification Systems - 4
Human Error
Classification Systems - 5
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Another Cognitively Based System -
Slips vs. Mistakes by Reason and Navon |
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Slips are errors in execution |
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Mistakes are errors in planning an
action |
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Lawrence’s (1974) Model with Relative
Frequency |
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Failure to perceive a hazard 36% |
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Underestimate a hazard 25% |
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Failure to respond 17% |
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Ineffective response 14 |
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Importance: Different types of errors
need different types of actions to prevent. |
Error Measurement
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Variable Error: errors that differ from trial to trial. |
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Constant Error: errors that are
constant from trial to trial. |
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Figure - after Champanis (1951) |
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Constant are easier to predict and thus
correct. |
Human-Machine and Error
Analysis
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A Brief Overview |
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Some Steps that are part of a complete
analysis (Swain & Guttman, 1980) |
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1. Describe system goals and
functions. |
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2. Describe situation. |
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3. Describe tasks and jobs. |
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4. Analyze tasks for where
errors are likely. |
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5. Estimate probability of
each error. |
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6. Estimate probability
error is not corrected. |
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7. Devise means to increase
reliability. |
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8. Repeat steps 4 - 7in
light of changes. |
Calculation of Human
Error Probability
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There are several techniques, will
discuss THERP (Swain, 1963) |
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Start at top with probability of
correct/incorrect action. |
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Next act is probability of given the
last action. |
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These are conditional probabilities -
They are not independent. |
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Sum of partial error probabilities at
bottom is overall error probability. |
Calculation of Human
Error Probability - 2
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THERP (Cont.) |
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In the diagram, a capital letter is a
correct outcome and a small letter is an erroneous action. |
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The | symbol indicates a conditional
probability. |
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Apply to starting a car. |
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K = correct key |
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k = incorrect key |
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S = getting key into ignition |
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s = missing ignition |
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P(S|K) is probability of getting key
into ignition, given getting correct key. This is the only correct outcome. |
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P(error) = 1-P(S|K) |
Calculation of Human
Error Probability - 2
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To get probabilities of specific
actions, it is common to used tabled values. |
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Example HEPs (Swain and Guttman, 1980) |
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Select wrong control in a group
.003 |
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of labeled identical controls |
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Turn control wrong direction .5 |
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under stress when design |
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violates population norm. |
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Failure to recognize an incorrect
.01 |
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status of item in front of
operator |
Effects of System
Complexity on Reliability
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In general reliability goes down as
number of components goes up (i.e. as complexity goes up). |
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Components in a Series |
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In a series if any single component
fails the whole system fails - the four tires on the car. |
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Rs = R1 * R2 * ... * Rn |
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Examples: All components have
reliability of 0.90. |
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n = 1 | Rs = = .90 |
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n = 2 | Rs = .9*.9 =
.81 |
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n = 3 | Rs =
.9*.9*.9 = .73 |
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n = 10 | Rs = .910 =
.35 |
Effects of Redundancy on
Reliability
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Active Redundancy: Both components
operate all the time but only one is needed. |
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Failure occurs only when both fail or
(EP1)*(EP2) |
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Thus reliability is:RS = 1 -
P(1-RI) |
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Example: Use two components and both
components have a reliability of 0.90. |
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In a series| Rs = .9*.9 =
.81 (above) |
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Redundant| Rs = 1-(1-.9)2 = .99 |
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Two redundant components in a series| |
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Rs = .99*.99 =
.98 |
Techniques to Improve
Reliability
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HARDWARE |
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KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid). |
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A-10 ~33% unavailable at any one
time. |
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F-111D ~66% unavailable |
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Apache Helicopter is similar record to
F-111D |
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Make it reliable/Quality Control |
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HUMAN |
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Use human factors knowledge in design -
back to Three-Mile Island. |
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Use human as redundant system. |
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Others? |
Risk Analysis
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DEFINITION: An estimation of the
consequences associated with particular errors. |
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Includes estimate of probability |
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i.e., risk =
p(error)*consequences(error) |
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Can be any sort of risk |
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e.g., loss of life, money, etc. |
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Must estimate significance of these
various consequences |
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Used to assist many types of decisions: |
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Estimates of safety |
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Estimates of probable success |
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Types of training to use to help
operators not to miss important errors |